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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
EsTATES IN Fts TAiL.-Quite generally estates in fee tail under the STATUT4
D4 DONIS were recognized by the states as a part of the common law. Sta-
tutory provisions in the way of modification and abolishment of such estates,
however, are very common. The nature and scope of the statutory pro-
visions have varied. See the states classified according to the character
of the legislation in BIEWSTSR, CONVEYANCING, § § 142, 143.
In Ewing v. Nesbitt, 88 Kans. 708, 129 Pac. 1131 (1913), commented upon
in Ii M Vc. LAW Rrv., 534, the court was called upon to consider the nature
and incidents of an estate in fee tail in Kansas. There was no statute on
the subject, and the court therefore held that the estate could be created
there as at common law. But since the common law methods of barring
the entail were inconsistent with their modes of procedure, an ordinary
deed of conveyance properly executed would accomplish the same result.
In some states the statutes have expressly provided that a conveyance by
the tenant in tail duly executed (sometimes with special formalities), shall
have the effect of barring the entail. See, for example, MASS. Riv. LAWS,
1go2, ch. 127, § 24; RIvismD COD ov D, T.AwAu (1893), chap. 83, § 27, PUR-
DON's DIGIST (PA.), 1483-1485. In Delaware, statutes further provide that
the grantee in any deed made by the proper officers pursuant to execution
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process "shall hold the premises therein conveyed with all their appurten-
ances, as fully and amply, and for such estate and estates, and under such
rents and services, as he or they, for whose debt, or duty, the same shall
be sold, might or could do, at or before the taking thereof in execution!'
Rzv. CODE (1893), ch: III, § 27.
In Hazzard v. Hazzard, 5 Boyce-, 94 AtI. go5 (I915), noted in I5
COLUMBIA L. REV., 618, lands devised in fee tail, with remainder over,
were sold on execution on judgment against the tenant in tail and sheriff's
deed given therefor. After death of the execution debtor, the remainderman
sued in ejectment to recover possession from the grantee of the grantee in
the sheriff's deed. The court held, under the provisions of the statutes
above referred to, that the grantee in the sheriff's deed took a fee simple.
The court concluded that, under the statutory provision above quoted, the
purchaser took such estate or estates as the debtor might or could convey.
The Supreme Court of Delaware has now reversed that judgment, holding
that the purchaser at execution sale gets only an estate for the life of
the tenant in tail. Hazzard v. Hazzard, 97 AtI. 233 (igi6).
The conclusion of the court is supported by Elliott v. Pearsoll, 8 Watts &
S., 38 (1844), PuRDoN's DIGsT (i818), 199, containing a provision similar
to the Delaware statute, and the construction of the statute would seem to
be sound despite the unfortunate results. Under this decision there is
available in Delaware a very effective means of keeping land out of the
reach of creditors, except for the limited interest as appears above, a means
almost as effective and pernicious as the tenancy by entireties, at least as
the same is worked out in Michigan.
Another interesting case showing that the often supposed obsolete estate
tail is still of very considerable importance is Dungan v. Kline, 8i Oh. St.
371, 90 N. E. 938 (igio), from which it appears how land in Ohio may be
entailed for one generation. R. W. A.
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